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NEGRO DEFENDANTS AND SOUTHERN LAWYERS:
REVIEW IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS OF
SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF NEGROES
FROM JURIES*
IN a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a state prisoner, a federal district
court is asked to determine whether a state conviction was in accordance with
the Constitution and laws of the United States.' The principle underlying
review in habeas corpus of all federal questions involved in state dispositions
seems to be that a federal forum should be available at some point in the
process for a hearing on a federal claim.2 Before a state prisoner can bring
his petition, however, he must raise his federal claim in the state courts and
seek a decision from the highest court of the state as well as from the United
States Supreme Court.3 By thus affording the state courts an opportunity to
decide the defendant's federal claim, friction between the state and federal court
systems is sought to be reduced. WArhere the state court bases its decision on a
state procedural rule without disposing of the federal claim or refuses to decide
the federal claim because of a rule of state procedure, the federal court in the
habeas corpus proceeding must decide an additional question: whether the state
procedural rule bars the federal court from inquiry into the merits of the de-
fendant's federal claim.4 The answer provided by the courts to this question is
-United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
850 (1959) ; United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 31 U.S.L. VEEK 3103 (U.S. Sept. 24, 1962).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) ; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953). See generally
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 H~nv. L. RE%.
1315, 1324-32 (1961) ; Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARtv L. Rv.
84, 103-08 (1959).
2. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953), see Mr. Justice Frandurter's opinion,
id. at 497-513; Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). See Hart, spra note 1, at 106. Al-
though the federal court has the power to order a full trial on the alleged constitutional
deprivation, the federal judge has discretion on whether to hold such a hearing. Deference
will be given to state court findings of fact. Brown v. Allen, supra at 502-03. Justice Reed
has stated that the state court's resolution of the constitutional issue carries the weight
of the "conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitutional
issues." Id. at 458.
3. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ; Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 213 (1950).
28 U.S.C. § 2254 states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of
circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
See generally Reitz, supra note 1, at 1324-32.
4. A state procedural determination is an "independent and adequate state ground."
See Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935).
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by no means clear.5 It is clear, however, that federal courts, in order to avoid
undue interference with the administration of state tribunals, should act with
great restraint in disregarding state dispositions based upon local procedural
rules. For to ignore indiscriminately state dispositions based upon a failure to
comply with such procedural rules would seriously undermine the authority of
the states to regulate and enforce the procedures of their own courts.0 On the
other hand, to give effect to every instance of noncompliance with state pro-
5. The relationship between the federal and state court systems is different in the habeas
corpus context than on direct review of state court decisions by the Supreme Court. For
in the latter situation, if the Supreme Court reverses a state court's disposition of a federal
question, the case will be remanded to the state courts. Reitz, supra note 1, at 1347. How-
ever, if a federal court on habeas corpus finds a constitutional infirmity, the state proceed-
ing is voided and the state given an opportunity to retry the prisoner within a specified
time. United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345, 365 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 369 U.S.
869 (1962) ; Bailey v. Henslee, 287 F.2d 936, 948 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877
(1961).
This difference in relationship between federal and state courts on direct review and
habeas corpus raises the question whether the doctrine of the independent and adequate state
ground, part of the jurisdictional limits of the Supreme Court on direct review, should be
read into the law of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of the independent and adequate state ground rests on the idea that a federal
court should not rule on the federal claim where the state decision rests upon state law.
Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARv. L. Rv. 1375,
1379 (1961). Although the Supreme Court has not definitely ruled on whether the doctrine
of the independent and adequate state ground is part of the law of habeas corpus (the
majority in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 406 (1959), did not reach this question; see also
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953)), both Mr. justice Frankfurter and Professor
Hart would read this doctrine into the law of habeas corpus, though for different reasons.
The Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345, 357 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 369 U.S. 869 (1962), has stated that the doctrine is part of the law of liabeas
corpus.
According to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view, the federal courts have "no power to sit in
judgment upon a determination of a state court unless it is found that it must rest on dis-
position of a claim under federal law." Irvin v. Dowd, .mpra at 407 (dissenting opinion).
However, under this view it is ultimately open to the Court to decide what is an independent
and adequate state ground. See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955) ; United States
ex rel. Noia v. Fay, supra at 359-61; Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Su-
preme Court, 74 HA v. L. REv. 1375, 1383-92 (1961).
The Hart view rests its application of the independent and adequate state ground to
habeas corpus law on the very nature of the sound operation of the federal system, Thus,
under this view, not every state law determination would be sacrosanct; rather, the state
disposition must be evaluated in the light of its reasonableness. I-Tart, Foreword: The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 84, 116-19 (1959).
6. It has been argued that the doctrine of independent and adequate state ground, supra
note 5, should not be read into habeas corpus law because, unlike remand on direct review,
a state court is not forced to bypass its own procedural rule and consider the federal ques-
tion. It has also been argued that if habeas corpus becomes a method for vindication of
federal rights whenever violated, better state procedures will evolve and more cases will be
decided on the merits. Reitz, supra note 1, at 1338-63; see text at note 43 infra. However,
even though the result of the habeas corpus proceeding is not to force the state court to con-
sider the federal question, voiding the state conviction and freeing the prisoner, if the state
does not retry him in a reasonable time, will have a great effect on the state procedural
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cedural law, and thus to refuse to pass on the federal claim whenever the state
courts have so declined, appears inconsistent with the policy of broad review of
state determinations of federal issues designed to secure to a defendant the
protections afforded by the Constitution.7 Thus, in these situations a balance
must be struck between these two competing interests.
The recent decision of the Fifth Circuit in United States cx rel. Goldsby vu.
Harpole 8 provides a dramatic illustration of the extent to which social practices
and customs in the South may determine whether a particular application of
a state procedural rule precluding a hearing on a federal claim imposes an un-
due burden on the constitutional right of a defendant to be tried before a fairly
constituted jury. The usual rule in state and federal courts requires that objec-
tions to the composition of the jury be raised at early stages of the trial. Failure
to make a timely objection results in a "waiver" or forfeiture of the oppor-
tunity to object.9 Time and expense of an additional trial are thus minimized
by reducing the possibility of the jury being adjudged improperly constituted
after part or all of the trial has taken place. Although this procedural require-
ment appears reasonable on its face, the Fifth Circuit found that application of
the rule, when considered in the light of the realities of Negro-white relations
and the resultant practices of white lawyers in the South, would not afford
sufficient protection to the constitutional rights of Negro defendants in the
South. The court thus held that the defendant's failure to make a timely objec-
tion to the exclusion of Negroes from the jury did not preclude consideration
of the exclusion issue in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Defendant, a Negro, was convicted by a jury in Carroll County, lississippi,
and sentenced to death for the murder of a white woman. After arraignment
the Negro lawyer who was representing the defendant prepared a motion to
quash the indictment on the ground that Negroes had been systenmtically ex-
cluded from the grand jury. Before this motion was presented, however, two
white lawyers replaced the Negro attorney.10 No objection based on jury ex-
system. No longer could a state be sure of its convictions, even though its courts rest their
decisions on reasonable procedural rules. This is likely to have a detrimental influence on
the effective enforcement of the criminal law by the states, who are primarily responsible
for its administration.
7. Note 2 supra.
8. 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959). Compare this fact situation
to Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955), where the court did not recognize the
social customs of the South.
9. See, e.g., State v. Ferraro, 146 Conn. 59, 147 A.2d 478 (1958), cert. denicd, 369 U.S.
880 (1962) ; Varble v. Whitecotton, 354 Mo. 570, 190 S.AV.2d 244 (1945) ; Brown v. State,
208 Ark. 180, 185 S.W2d 274 (1945). See generally, 50 C.J.S. Jies § 263 (1947). As to
challenges to the grand jury, see FaD. R. Cynt. P. 12(b) (2) ; Michel v. Louisiana, 350
U.S. 91 (1955).
Different procedural systems may allow the objection to be made at different times and
set up different standards of relieving a party of "waiver" of the opportunity to raise the
objection.
10. One of the white lawyers was hired by the aunt of the defendant. 263 F.2d at 74.
There was testimony by DeWillie Goldsby, brother of the accused, that this white lawyer
1963]
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clusion was made either at the trial or upon appeal to the state Supreme Court.
At this point the Negro lawyer re-entered the case, and raised for the first time
the issue of jury exclusion in a petition for certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court. Upon denial of certiorari, a petition for a writ of error coram
nobis, or in the alternative habeas corpus, was filed in the Supreme Court of
Mississippi. That court held that the objection to the composition of the juries
should have been raised at trial and therefore was untimely." Defendant then
unsuccessfully petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. 1 2
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed both the district court's
denial of defendant's petition for habeas corpus and its finding that there was
in fact no exclusion, and thus held the state conviction void.'
In holding that the petitioner could raise the jury exclusion issue in the habeas
corpus proceeding, 14 the Fifth Circuit, after finding blatant discrimination in
the method of jury selection,'5 stated:
stated that he could not work with a Negro lawyer. Id. at 93. The other white lawyer was
appointed by the court. Id. at 74.
11. Goldsby v. State, 226 Miss. 1, 27, 86 So. 2d 27, 32 (1956). The state Supreme Court
also held that the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court was res adjudicata
on the merits of the claim. Ibid. This is clearly erroneous. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S, 443,
489-98 (1953).
12. The opinion of the district court denying the writ is unreported. The court held
essentially that no systematic exclusion had been shown and that the objection had been
waived by the defendant and his counsel. The federal district court had previously denied
the writ without a hearing. The Fifth Circuit reversed this initial denial and remanded for
a hearing by the district court on the petition. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole,
249 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1957).
13. The state retried Goldsby and again he was sentenced to death. Under the law of
Mississippi, the relatives of the victim of a crime have the right to hire a private attorney
to aid the state in the prosecution. The victim's husband had hired Ross R. Barnett as spe-
cial prosecutor. Barnett, who ran on a platform of strict segregation (The Saturday Eve-
ning Post, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 20), was Governor-elect at the time of his appearance in the
second trial. The state Supreme Court ruled unfavorably upon the defense's objection to
the appearance of the Governor-elect at the trial, Goldsby v. State, 240 Miss. 647, 123 So,
2d 429 (1960), and the Court denied certiorari, 365 U.S. 861 (1961). Goldsby has been put
to death.
14. The Fifth Circuit in Goldsby held that the objection to the grand jury was effec.
tively waived by counsel and could not be raised in the habeas corpus proceeding. Tile
court's rationale is that the right to a nondiscriminatory petit jury is far more important
than the right to a non-discriminatory grand jury. 263 F.2d at 80-81. However, if the court
feels the objection was not raised for illegitimate motives on the part of the lawyer, see
text at note 18 infra, it would appear that the result should be the same whether the grand
or petit jury is involved. The court also stated that any grand jury would have indicted
the defendant. 263 F.2d at 81. However in United States cx rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d
53 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEi 3103 (U.S. Sept. 24, 1962), involving
essentially similar facts as Goldsby, the Fifth Circuit departed from the above rationale and
held that the objections to both the petit and grand juries were not waived even though the
facts warranted, the inference that any grand jury would have returned an indictment,
Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit in Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir.
1962) (dissenting), interpreted the holding of Goldsby to mean that "before a defendant
will be deemed to have waived objection to trial by a petit jury infected by an- unconstitu.
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As Judges of a Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think
that it is our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers residing in many
southern jurisdictions rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue
of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries.' 0
tional exclusion for race, the record must show that the defendant, not just his counsel,
took the action, deliberately and after advice." Compare this with the statement in Goldsby
that an objection would be considered waived on habeas corpus "where the record affirma-
tively shows that the particular jury was desired by defendant's counsel after conscientious
consideration of that course of action which would be best for the client's case." 263 F.2d
at 83.
15. Carroll County, Mississippi, according to the 1950 United States Census had a
population of 15,448 persons of whom 8,836 were nonwhite. Yet none of the local officials
called as witnesses could recall any instance of a Negro having been on a jury list. 263
F2d at 78. The jury lists were taken from the voter lists. The Goldsby court stated:
We have called the figures startling, but we do not feign surprise because we have
long known that there are counties not only in Mississippi, but in the writer's own
home state of Alabama, in which Negroes constitute the majority of the residents
but take no part in government either as voters or as jurors. Familiarity with such
a condition thus prevents shock, but it all the more increases our concern over its
existence.
263 F.2d at 78-79.
16. 263 F.2d at 82. Although the court does not limit its statement to white lawyers,
this implication is apparent from the opinion. In United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304
F.2d 53, 68 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. NVFmr 3103 (U.S. Sept. 24, 1962),
the Fifth Circuit in referring to Goldsby states, "We pointed out the difficulties under which
white lawyers labored in raising the objection."
The court's chain of reasoning seems to involve three steps. The court takes judicial
notice that lawyers rarely raise the exclusion issue. Implicit in this statement must be the
premise that in many southern jurisdictions there is systematic exclusion of Negroes from
the jury. For without this premise, the failure of counsel to raise the objection is not relevant
in advancing the conclusion of the court that "something suspicious" has taken place. The
third step in the court's reasoning seems to be that more often than not a lawyer should
raise the exclusion issue when the facts so warrant an objection.
This use of judicial notice seems to be an extension, of the doctrine. But it may be justi-
fiable on the ground that it is a legislative fact, i.e., information used by a judge in creating
new law. Under this doctrine there is no rigid requirement of certainty in the use of legis-
lative facts. McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAD. L. REv. 296, 315 (1952). But see MoDEL
CODE OF EviDExcE rules 801, 802 (1942); Uzxions Ruix OF EVIDENCE 9(1), (2), which
limit judicial notice to the indisputable, and to specific facts of generalized knowledge which
are capable of immediate and accurate demonstrations by resort to easily accessible sources
of indisputable accui-acy. See generally Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. RFY. 269
(1944).
One may question why the court used judicial notice rather than making it part of the
petitioner's case to produce facts showing that there was a systematic failure on the part
of the lawyers in the particular area to challenge jury arrays. This, coupled with a show-
ing of jury exclusion in the particular area, would seem a more solid foundation on which
to rest the conclusion. Omission to raise the issue may well be common throughout the
Fifth Circuit, but a general tendency tells little concrete about the particular area.
In a questionnaire prepared by the Journal and sent to 100 state judges in the Fifth
Circuit asking their opinions as to the validity of what the Fifth Circuit judicially noticed,
31 out of 35 judges responding stated that they felt the Fifth Circuit was correct in, notic-
ing that lawyers rarely raise the exclusion issue. However, 29 judges of the 31 responded
that the reason the issue was not raised was because there vas no systematic exclusion of
1963]
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Concluding that there had been no express waiver by the defendant himself of
his constitutional right, the court held that the objection was not lost because
of counsel's failure to object unless some reason appeared for not raising the
objection.17 The court, in voiding the state conviction, apparently inferred from
the fact that southern lawyers rarely raise the objection and the lack of an ex-
planation for the failure to raise it in this case that trial counsel may not have
been acting in the best interests of his client in not raising the exclusion issue.18
The court, however, did not attempt to determine why the objection was not
raised at trial.19
In assessing the relative weights of the state interest in enforcement of its
procedural rule and the defendant's interest in having a hearing on his federal
constitutional claim, consideration of possible social pressures and the attitude
of lawyers in the South toward the issue of jury exclusion seems warranted.
For the reasonableness of the application of the procedural requirement barring
review of the federal issue and the extent to which such application impairs
the defendant's constitutional right to a fairly constituted jury depend upon
such factors. But a finding that a particular application of this procedural re-
quirement is unreasonable does not ineluctably follow from the fact that there
is systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries and that lawyers rarely raise the
issue at trial. Rather it would seem to depend upon the reason the defense
failed to raise the issue in a particular case. The court in Goldsby pointed to
some facts which made the motives of defendant's counsel suspect and ques-
tioned whether the defendant was effectively represented by counsel on this
issue at trial,20 but refused to remand for a further inquiry into the reason re-
sponsible for the alleged "waiver" of the objection. 21 Assuming such an inquiry
was administratively practical, it clearly would seem relevant, since in the ab-
sence of special circumstances, a defendant is ordinarily held accountable for
his counsel's or his own decisions at trial.22
Negroes from jury lists. One judge felt that the issue was not raised because the lawyer
did not want to prejudice his own, position in the community, and two felt that the reason
was to prevent damage to the defendant's case by injecting the racial issue. Four judges
indicated they felt that lawyers believed that exclusion of Negroes would not affect the out-
come of the case. (Some judges responded on the basis of two reasons.)
17. 263 F.2d at 83.
18. See note 20 infra.
19. The result in the Goldsby case may require the state in order to uphold its con-
victions in this type situation either to call defendant's trial counsel or to insure that there
is sufficient reason in the record to explain the waiver satisfactorily. The defense counsel
may be put in the awkward position, of being called as a witness by the state to uphold the
state's conviction.
20. The court pointed out that the Negro lawyer was willing to raise the exclusion
issue. The white lawyer refused to join with the Negro lawyer in representing the defend-
ant and the white lawyer never raised the issue after the Negro lawyer left the case. 263
F.2d at 83.
21. The court considered remanding the case for further hearings, but rejected this idea
on the grounds that the defendant had already been confined too long. 263 F.2d at 84,
22. Popeko v. United States, 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1961) ; O'Malley v. United States,
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Establishment in later proceedings of the motive of the defense in not object-
ing at trial may pose extremely difficult problems of proof. Nevertheless an
examination of the reasons that may be responsible for a failure to make a time-
ly objection in a particular case will help delineate those situations in which a
failure to object at trial should not preclude a hearing on the federal claim in
the habeas corpus proceeding. A number of such reasons are possible. The
defendant's lawyer may fear that his own standing in the community will be
prejudiced if he raises an objection to a practice which reflects existing social
patterns. On the other hand, it may be felt that such an objection would stir up
racial feeling against the defendant, thereby damaging his chances for acquittal
or a lighter sentence. Or perhaps the defense believes that it makes no differ-
ence to the outcome of the case whether or not there is jury exclusion, and
that the trial should not be prolonged by a "mere technical objection." Finally,
the failure to raise the issue of exclusion at trial might be explained by a lack
of knowledge on the part of the defense of the facts warranting such an objec-
tion.Y
If the composition of the jury is not objected to at trial because the lawyer
fears for his own position in the community, or because he wishes to preserve
his community's racial status quo,25 and the state court refuses to give relief on
285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958) ; Kennedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 994 (1959).
23. The court mentions two reasons. First, since Negroes may be removed by peremp-
tory challenges before the petit jury is selected, there may be little practical protection for
the individual Negro defendant, and it may be "practically inadvisable for a defendant in
a particular case to raise the issue." Second, lawyers may not wish to risk "loss of practice
and social ostracism." 263 F.2d at 82.
"Lemme tell you somethin' now, Billy," a third said, "you know the court appointed
him to defend this nigger." "Yeah, but Atticus aims to defend him. That's what I
don't like about it."
LE, To KitL A MOCKINGBIRD 165 (pop. lib. ed. 1962).
24. In response to a questionnaire prepared by the Journal and sent to 100 southern
lawyers whose names were picked at random, 20 stated that they felt the Fifth Circuit was
correct in taking judicial notice that lawyers in the South rarely raise the issue of jury
exclusion. Fourteen felt the Fifth Circuit was incorrect either because there is no jury en-
clusion (9) or because the issue is raised when the facts so warrant (5).
In answer to the question whether you would "raise at trial level the issue of systematic
exclusion of Negroes from the jury, if you thought there was reasonable evidence of such
exclusion," 21 answered yes and 13 responded no.
Reasons given, for the failure to raise the objection included a desire not to prejudice the
lawyer's position in the community (2), a desire not to prejudice the client's interests by
stirring up community feeling against him, thereby hoping to achieve the best result for
the Negro client (11), and a feeling that it would make no difference to the outcome of the
case whether or not there is jury exclusion (15).
25. In response to the questionnaire prepared by the Journal, one Alabama law.yer
wrote:
If I accepted a Negro for jury duty and put him on with 11 white men I would
prejudice the white men against me and my client.
A lawyer in Florida wrote:
It has been my observation and it is my present thinking that the interests of a Negro
client in the South would be better protected by the white man than colored.
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the ground that the objection is tardy, the federal court should hear the sub-
stantive issue in the habeas corpus proceeding. In effect, the defendant had no
opportunity to have a hearing on his constitutional claim in the state system.
And if the federal court also refuses to consider the constitutional claim, the
defendant will never have had an opportunity to have his constitutional right
vindicated. The Supreme Court has indicated that a defendant will not be held
responsible in a habeas corpus hearing for a failure to adhere to every procedural
requirement of state law where the defendant was not represented by counsel.
Thus, in Daniels v. Allen 26 the Court, in holding that defendant lost the oppor-
tunity to raise his constitutional claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
because he had forfeited his right of appeal in the state system by filing the ap-
peal one day after the deadline set by the North Carolina trial court,27 added
that the opportunity to raise the objection would not be lost where the prisoner
failed to perfect a timely appeal in the state system because of lack of counsel. 2 8
Where counsel acts in his own interest, and not in the interests of his client, in
failing to raise the objection to exclusion at trial, the defendant can hardly be
said to have been represented by counsel on this facet of the case. 29 Indeed, the
defendant is at a greater disadvantage where he is formally, but not effectively,
represented by counsel than where he is not represented by counsel at all.10
Thus, such a defendant should not be held responsible for non-compliance with
a procedural requirement with which he could not be expected to comply with-
out the assistance of counsel.
In determining whether the federal court on habeas corpus should hear the
constitutional claim where the defense failed to raise the issue during the trial
because of fear of stirring up community racial feeling against the accused, the
26. Decided with Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 at 482 (1953).
27. In this situation the defendant lost the opportunity to have a hearing on his con-
stitutional claim in both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the federal courts. This
failure occurred not because his attorney did not represent him on this facet of the case,
but because his attorney failed to follow state procedure. See text at note 45 infIra.
28. Id. at 485-86 (dictum). See also Whitley v. Steiner, 293 F.2d 895, 899 (4th Cir.
1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 980 (1962).
29. It has been held that the right to counsel is satisfied where counsel appeared except
where the appearance was a farce or mockery of justice. See O'Malley v. United States,
285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
30. In this type of situation the defendant may have a false sense of security. Where
he has no counsel, the defendant must himself make all the decisions.
In Porter v. United States, 298 F2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1962), involving allegations that
defendant's counsel also represented a police officer who might have played a role in the
case, it was stated:
The Constitution assures a defendant effective representation by counsel whether
the attorney is one of his own choosing or court-appointed. Such representation is
lacking, however, if counsel, unknown to the accused and without his knowledgeable
assent, is in a duplicitous position, where his full talents-as a vigorous advocate
having the single aim of acquittal by all means fair and honorable-are hobbled or
fettered or restrained by commitments to others.
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first question to be answered is whether such a fear is well-founded. 3 L For if
there was no reasonable basis for believing that the objection would prejudice
the accused, the defense had an adequate opportunity to raise the issue before
the trial court but, because of a mistaken belief, adopted a different strategy.
This situation seems indistinguishable from an ordinary instance of trial strategy
deliberately adopted by counsel in the best interests of his clienta 2 If the federal
courts disregard state procedural rules on the basis of mistakes in trial tactics,
there would be virtually no restrictions upon inquiry into federal questions in
habeas corpus proceedings. If there was a real possibility of such prejudice,
however, the defendant or his counsel was, in effect, forced to choose between
foregoing the right to a fairly constituted jury and, by asserting the constitu-
tional right, running the risk of having community racial prejudice play a more
damaging role in the trial than it otherwise would.33 A defendant should not
be put to this choice.as
It might be objected that such a holding would lead federal courts to disre-
gard every waiver of a constitutional right which is elicited by community
feeling. For example, one accused of a brutal sex crime may be forced by com-
munity hostility to forego his right to a jury trial and choose instead to be tried
by a judge.3 5 But to hold that a Negro, forced by latent community feelings to
forego his right to a fairly constituted jury, can raise the issue in a habeas
corpus proceeding need not imply that a federal court must listen to a convicted
rapist's plea that he was similarly forced to waive his right to a jury trial.1a
31. Evidence of past outbreaks of racial strife, militant racial organizations, the extent
of segregation, and testimony of residents as to community feeling may prove relevant.
32. See text at note 22 stpra.
33. In response to the Journal questionnaire one lawyer from Alabama responded:
The consequences of having a Negro or two on, the jury, contrary to local practices,
might be disastrous to the Negro client being tried. The client deserves consideration
of his case without the possible, even, probable, feeling of resentment by some of the
white jurors. The lawyer's duty is to his client in the particular case being tried;
not to the matter of principle involved. I think I would not agree to the exclusion
in a case so nearly hopeless that only the presence of a juror with possible prejudice
in favor of the defendant could hope to prevent conviction.
A Georgia lawyer answered:
To attempt to show e-xclusion, I believe would prejudice a Negro client's case. Al-
though we are slowly realizing the discrimination, to take a "middle of the road"
stand, at present, would be the wiser course.
34. See Reitz, supra note 1, at 1370-73. Vaiver in one sense has been defined as a volun-
tary and understanding relinquishment of a known right. 92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1054 (1955).
In no sense can the choice in the hypothetical situation be said to be a voluntary choice
beween two meaningful alternatives. If waiver is used in another sense, forfeiture of the
opportunity to raise an objection, if not raised at the proper time, see Yakus v. United States
321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944), the procedural rule will reinforce community pressures which
initially tend to deprive the Negro of his rights. A legal bar is created preventing raising
an objection which social pressures initially caused not to be raised. This becomes a vicious
circle.
35. See Donnelly, The Defendant's Right to P aive Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 9
U. FLA. L. REv. 247 (1956).
36. The right to jury trial is usually granted by state constitutions. 50 C.J.S. Juries,
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For there are important differences in terms of the effect of the federal court's
willingness or refusal to respect the "waiver." If federal courts through the use
of habeas corpus force states to insure fairly constituted juries, the adverse
community reactions to requests for fairly constituted juries, and therefore de-
fendants' or their counsel's reluctance to raise the issue, should gradually dis-
appear. The prediction that forced integration of juries will lessen anti-Negro
prejudice in the community is not empirically demonstrable; indeed, it can be
argued that forced integration will exacerbate racial tensions. However, such
forced integration will lessen adverse community reactions to Negroes' demands
for fairly constituted juries.3r That is, if integrated juries become the rule
rather than the exception, prejudice in general may not be reduced, but the
feeling that a particular Negro is "making trouble" by demanding a fair jury
will be greatly diminished. The rapist example is different, however, because
the community hostility toward him is not elicited by the request for the con-
stitutional right, but rather such hostility is given effect through the fulfillment
of the right to a jury trial. If federal courts were to force states to insure those
accused of sex crimes jury trials, there would be no diminution of community
feeling against such defendants. Because the hostility arises from the nature of
the accusation, juries would remain hostile, and such defendants would remain
well advised to choose to be tried by a judge. Because it was never the request
for jury trials which angered the community, an increase in either jury trials
or requests therefore would not affect its feeling toward such defendants.
Until the impartial selection of jury members becomes the accepted practice
in any given locale, there will probably be at the second trial (after the voiding
of the first conviction) much of the racial feeling which would have been present
if the objection had been raised at the first trial. But presumably such objections
will only be raised by defendants who are dissatisfied with the outcome of the
first trial and stand little to lose by having another trial. In any case, the de-
fendant will have had one trial before a jury which will consider the merits
without injection of the racial issue and another trial before a jury from which
Negroes are not systematically excluded. However, since it is desirable from
the standpoint of the administration of a criminal system to uphold state pro-
cedures 39 except where to do so would place too great a burden on federal
rights, the objection to jury exclusion should first be raised in the state appel-
late courts if it was not raised at trial because of the fear of prejudice.40
§ 10 (1947). Equal protection questions are raised where a particular group is not afforded
the same measure of rights as other groups of accused criminals.
37. The anger of the community may possibly shift to the federal court.
38. Although these two trials may not be as valuable as one trial before a non-discriml-
natory jury which will consider the case on the merits, they are better than one trial before
either a non-discriminatory jury which will not consider the merits or a jury from which
Negroes are excluded which will consider the merits.
39. See note 6 supra.
40. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 203 (1950) ; see note 3 supra. Objection at the
appellate level will come too late to distort the first trial by injecting the racial issue, and
can elicit hostility only at a subsequent trial, which raising the issue on habeas corpus
will also do.
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Another reason for the failure to raise the exclusion issue at the trial level
may be a feeling on the part of the defendant or his counsel that jury exclusion
will have no effect on the outcome of the trial. Such a belief may stem either
from a general conviction that it makes no difference to the outcome of a case
whether or not Negroes are systematically excluded, or from satisfaction with
the personnel of the particular jury as drawn.41 The defense would regard an
objection to the composition of the jury in these situations as a useless, or indeed
harmful, waste of time. In either situation the federal court on habeas corpus
should respect a state rule requiring such objections to be made at trial. As
with other strategic moves made by the defense, the federal court should not
hear the issue merely because of a tactical miscalculation. Thus in Carruthers
v. Reed 42 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it would not hear the
exclusion claim where it appeared that the defense counsel knew of the consti-
tutional infirmity, but did not raise the question in the state trial court because
he was personally acquainted with certain jury members and felt that the ac-
cused would receive a fair trial.
Objection to jury exclusion may not have been made at the trial because the
defense attorney had no knowledge of the facts on which to base such an objec-
tion. Such facts may have been either overlooked by the defense attorney or
unobtainable at the time of the trial. Where the facts warranting an objection
based on jury exclusion should have been discovered by the defense attorney
before trial but were not, refusal of the federal court to hear the objection will
reinforce the objectives of the state rule by encouraging lawyers to be more
careful in preparing their cases. It has been suggested that the loss of the oppor-
tunity to raise the objection in the state court, without closing the federal forum
41. The lawyer may feel that a Negro .will not stand up in the face of a consensus of
white jurors. See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 55 (1951) (concurring opinion). One
Mississippi lawyer responded to the Journal questionnaire:
I have found that a Negro juror will bend over backward to vote for conviction of
another Negro when placed in the room with white jurors.
An Alabama lawyer wrote:
I do not want a Negro on a jury .... For he would not stand pat in the face of the
opposition, no matter what his personal conviction might be. If I were defending a
Negro, I certainly would not want Negroes on the jury. They would convict my
client a lot quicker than white jurors.
Southern lawyers may also feel that the presence of a Negro on a jury may actively
hurt their client's chances. Thus one Georgia lawyer stated:
I have also found that the Negroes we do have on, our juries are without exception
very savage and vindictive against members of their own race and to leave the ones
who are on the panel in the jury box is to do my client a great disservice.
Another Georgia lawyer answered that:
as a matter of fact Negro defendants do not want other local Negroes on the jury
and usually insist on my striking them.
One southern lawyer responded that Negroes "receive a fairer tria and more sympathy
from white jurors." A lawyer in Alabama stated that the Negro had "neither the maturity
nor judicial temperment" to serve on a jury.
42. 102 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 643 (1939).
1963]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in habeas corpus, would be sufficient to reinforce the state rule.43 This seems
erroneous in this situation, however, since a defense counsel presumably is not
interested in the number of times he can raise an objection, but in increasing
the probability that his client will be freed by maximizing the number of trials.
Even if the issue is not raised in the state court, the defendant has a chance for
acquittal in the first trial. Then, if the issue can be raised in the federal court
on habeas corpus and the first trial voided, the defendant will gain a second
chance for acquittal." If the objection were raised at trial and erroneously
denied, the client would, it is true, get two trials. But if an objection raised in
the original trial was sustained and a new jury drawn, the defendant would
have only one chance for acquittal. If the federal court did not respect the state
rule, therefore, the inducement for a lawyer to search out the facts and raise
the issue in accordance with the state procedural rule would be negligible.46
It is highly unlikely that a reasonable investigation by counsel before trial
would not uncover facts showing that Negroes have been systematically ex-
cluded from juries in a particular state. Where it appears, however, that the
defense, upon a reasonable investigation, could not have ascertained at the time
of the trial such facts, the federal court's refusal to hear the objection on habeas
corpus will not reinforce the state procedural rule. For lawyers cannot be in-
duced to raise an objection before they know, or should know, of the facts war-
ranting such objection.
The above solutions to the problem of whether a federal court on habeas
corpus should hear objections based on jury exclusion, notwithstanding the
failure to comply with the rules of state procedure, depend upon why the ob-
jection was not raised in the state system. Thus, a finding of fact as to cause
must be made. However, considerable problems are presented in attempting to
make a finding as to the motives of the defendant or his attorney. In the first
place, men seldom operate with wholly unmixed motives. The trial counsel of
the defendant will frequently be the only or, at least, the primary source of
evidence on the question of why the objection was not raised at trial. Since
counsel's personal reputation will often be drawn into question in such an in-
quiry, he can hardly be expected to confess his own dereliction of duty to his
client. 46 Moreover, serious questions in respect to a lawyer's obligation to his
client are raised when a defense attorney is called upon to give testimony as to
his past motives when the consequence of such testimony may mean life or death
43. Reitz, supra note 1, at 1350-51.
44. The chance that a meritorious habeas corpus petition may be overlooked must be
weighed. However, where the objection is not raised as a strategic move, it is likely that
the trial lawyer will draft the habeas corpus petition. The more clear and articulate the
petition, the less likely is it to be overlooked. Moreover, where the exclusion is blatant, there
is less likelihood that a meritorious petition will be overlooked.
45. There would even be positive inclination on the part of a conscientious lawyer not
to raise the issue in the trial court, thereby leaving a flaw which will gain a second trial.
46. A court is also put in a very difficult position when it is faced with the prospect of
finding as a fact that counsel was acting in his own interest, not in the interest of his client.
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for his client.47 If community pressures upon the lawyer prevented him from
raising the objection in the state trial, those same pressures may be exerted
upon him to give the "correct" answer before the federal tribunal. Further,
knowledge on the part of white lawyers that in defending Negro defendants they
may be exposing themselves to possible inquiry by another attorney into their
trial tactics and professional integrity may discourage them from handling
criminal cases involving Negro defendants.4 8 Testimony by the defendant on
this issue is likely to be consciously or unconsciously distorted when the con-
sequence of the answer will be either a new trial, death, or a prison term.
It is perhaps for these reasons that the Goldsby court refused to order an in-
quiry into the issue of why the exclusion objection was not raised at trial.
Where no objection to jury exclusion was raised in the state system and
there is no evidence of systematic failure on the part of lawyers in the area to
raise such objections, the federal court may be forced to base its decision upon
a determination of the motive of the lawyer in not raising the objection. How-
ever, where there is a history of long continuing exclusion of Negroes from
juries and evidence of systematic failure to raise the objection at trial, an in-
quiry into motive may not be necessary. Because of the difficulties and resultant
uncertainty of such an inquiry, upon which a death sentence or prison term
may depend, and because of the likelihood that the reason the objection was
not raised was due to existing community pressures or to failure on the part of
counsel to effectively represent the defendant on this issdte, a conclusive pre-
sumption as to motive seems warranted. Thus a federal court should hear the
constitutional issue although a state procedural rule was not followed whenever
the above two conditions are found to exist. It may be objected that a con-
clusive presumption as to motive in these circumstances would allow, or indeed
encourage, the defense to leave unnoticed the fatal flaw of jury exclusion in the
trial proceeding in order to seek an invalidation after trial in case the outcome
is adverse to the defendant. Thus, numerous state convictions might be subject
to attack on this ground. But a state may insulate its judgments from attack
by insuring that its methods of selecting a jury do not violate the Constitution.
Where the state actively creates, or passively nurtures, a social environment
which tends to deprive the Negro of his constitutiofial rights, the state should
not be able to force the federal court to make the almost impossible decision as
to whether in a particular case the failure to raise the objection was a product
of environmental pressure or trial strategy. In the absence of such a presump-
tion, an environment which tends to eliminate objections based upon jury ex-
clusion renders empty the guarantee of a fairly constituted jury.
47. It can be strongly argued that a lawyer should not do anything to prejudice the
case of a client or a former client.
48. Since there are few Negro lawyers in the South, public policy should encourage
white lawyers to take these cases. However, if a court is willing to indulge in this type of
inquiry, it is likely that it will become standard procedure for defendants to engage new
counsel after conviction, in order to question before the federal court the trial tactics of
former defense attorneys.
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. The recent case of United States ex rel. Seals v. Winan 49 illustrates the
difficulties a court may face in attempting to determine the defense attorney's
motive for not raising the issue and thus the need for a conclusive presumption
where the above two conditions are met. Defendant, a Negro, was indicted and
convicted before juries which the Fifth Circuit found constitutionally defective.
Defendant's trial counsel raised no objection and the attempt by a new defense
attorney to raise the question in the state appellate court was ruled too late.60
The Fifth Circuit found on habeas corpus that there was a "long-continued,
wide discrepancy between the number of qualified Negroes in the County and
their representation on the jury rolls. .. ."51 For many years a local newspaper
published venire lists indicating the race of those selected for the jury.6" Never-
theless the State Prosecutor appointed in 1943 testified that he could recall no
motion based on jury exclusion prior to the Seals case.aa And the trial attor-
ney stated that he had defended between fifteen and fifty Negroes for capital
crimes and that "he never had a Negro as one of the jurors in a capital case in
which a Negro was a defendant." He further testified that he had never raised
an objection on the grounds of systematic exclusion. This was explained on the
ground that in his opinion no basis existed for such an attack, but he stated
on cross-examination that he had no knowledge of the evidentiary facts upon
which to base a claim of systematic exclusion." The Fifth Circuit ruled that the
objection could be raised in the habeas corpus proceeding because the defendant
did not expressly waive his constitutional rights and because his attorney did
not know of the evidence indicating exclusion. The court further found that:
[the] evidence was not "easily ascertainable," but has been produced in
the hearing of this petition only as the result of unusual and exhaustive
investigation by Seals' present counsel."
Yet it would seem that facts to support an objection could have been dis-
covered before trial if an adequate investigation had been made, and, therefore,
under the above analysis, the federal court should not have granted a hearing
on the substantive issue on these grounds.r0 For to rationalize the decision in
49. 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEmx 3103 (U.S. Sept,
24, 1962).
50. On appeal to the state Supreme Court, the conviction was affirmed without men-
tion of the exclusion issue. Seals' trial attorney argued the appeal. Seals v. State, 271 Ala.
142, 122 So. 2d 513 (1960). A different attorney then entered the case and raised the ex-
clusion issue in a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The state Supreme Court ruled
that the objection came too late. Seals v. State, 271 Ala. 622, 126 So. 2d 474, cert. deldcd,
366 U.S. 954 (1961).
51. United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, supra note 49, at 67.
52. The court found that the number of new people added to the jury role each year
since 1953 did not significantly change the ratio of whites to Negroes, id. at 65, and that the
1953 figures as published demonstrated a prima facie case of jury exclusion. Ibid.
53. Id. at 68. The court stated that one such objection had been raised after the Seals
trial by a Negro attorney in another case.
54. Id. at 68 & n.6.
55. Id. at 69.
56. See text accompanying note 43 mupra.
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these terms may have the effect of encouraging lawyers to do inadequate re-
search in the hope of getting two trials. The Seals decision might better, and
perhaps more candidly, be rationalized on the ground that the evidence pre-
sented to the court did not afford an adequate basis, especially in view of the
fact that a man's life was at stake,57 for a decision as to the real reason the
objection was not raised at trial. In this case there was evidence of systematic
failure to raise the jury issue on the part of lawyers, long-continued jury ex-
clusion and a social environment built on segregation. Thus the objection
should have been heard even though there was a failure to comply with the
state procedural rule. A state with such a record, if it is to uphold its criminal
convictions, will either have to insure that there is no jury exclusion or work
to change a social environment which tends to deprive Negroes of their consti-
tutional rights.
57. The Supreme Court has evidenced great concern when life is at stake. See Williams
v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955).
